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


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
GREATER CANADA, AND THE PEACE PROBLEM

BY ROBERT STEIN

With Three Maps



WASHINGTON, D. C.
JUDD & DETWEILER, Inc., PRINTERS
1914



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THE GREAT CANADIAN AND THE FUTURE PROBLEM

By H. H. H. H.

1911

The Great Canadian and the Future Problem is a book by H. H. H. H. It is a book about the future of Canada and the world. It is a book that is worth reading for everyone who is interested in the future of our country and our world.

WASHINGTON D. C.
JAMES O. KELLEY, JR.
1911

Greater Canada and the Peace Problem

By ROBERT STEIN

The rejection of reciprocity by Canada, as evidence of her devotion to the Mother Country, may prove to have been one of the happiest events in history, if both parties will but heed its most important lesson. To those expansive gentlemen who are eager to convert the nine Canadian Provinces into nine American States, it says that they can not annex Canada except by reannexing the whole British empire. To the Canadians, who think that the empire needs their support, it suggests that the empire would be forever secure, if it could but reannex the fragment which unwillingly broke loose 138 years ago. Mutual Anglo-American reannexation would in fact be the greatest blessing that could be bestowed on the world at this moment. Placing the globe under the control of the two most advanced branches of the Aryan race, the Celtic and Germanic, it would mean the instant establishment of that permanent universal "peace with righteousness" which, according to Colonel Roosevelt, is the only peace that is really a blessing.

The reunion is delayed not by obstacles founded on argument, but solely by the habit which civilized men have in-

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herited from their savage ancestors, to continue in the rut into which the caprice of accident has kicked them. One gets an appalling sense of human weakness on pondering over the fact that a narrow-minded king, never quite sane, had the power to split asunder a nation comprising thousands of men of superb intellect, to whom union and the British name were dearer than anything except liberty; while the fact that the two fragments, having long outgrown the conditions that made the mischief possible, still allow it to continue, is equally grotesque proof that the men of the present day, who boast so loudly of their reasoning and destiny-making powers, are, like their grandfathers, the helpless playthings of blind natural forces.

Imperial federation has been discussed for years. The difficulties that delay its consummation would be swept away in an instant by Anglo-American reunion. In an Anglo-Saxon, or, as Mr. Carnegie would prefer to call it, Celtanglian Federation, the United States would bear to Canada the same relation that Australia does now. Closer union than that is not needed.

How are these good things to be attained? Not by sitting still and sighing for them, or prophesying that they will come in time, but by taking thought and working. In the following pages an attempt will be made to prove that the acquisition of Greenland by Canada would almost certainly lead to Anglo-American reunion, with all its incalculable consequences, including permanent universal peace. That is a startling assertion, but if a gain of a million square miles, without the expenditure of a cent, nay, with a saving of many

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millions of dollars, by merely saying "Aye," seem an enticing prospect, and if Canada can thereby render to the Mother Country a service immeasurably exceeding any other that can be conceived, it is hoped that Canadian readers will have the patience to listen with unbiased minds to a brief statement of the argument.

* * *

First of all, aside from any ulterior motives, the acquisition of Greenland would be of decided benefit to Canada.

(1) During the past decade, Canadians have become aware of the possibilities of wealth in those Arctic lands to which Canada, through the energy of Captain Bernier, has recently acquired perfect title. That wealth, however, must remain dormant so long as adequate transportation facilities are lacking. To establish a regular system of transportation is difficult unless it can be made to pay from the very start. In the present case the difficulty arises mainly from the fact that the two shores of Baffin Bay belong to different nations. The Greenland trade of Denmark has long been carried on at a loss, while the Canadian side of the Bay has no trade at all.

The acquisition of Greenland by Canada would change all that. At Ivigtut, near the south end of Greenland, there is a cryolite mine, the ore from which is shipped partly to Denmark and partly to the United States. Were Greenland a part of Canada, that profitable industry would of course be transferred to some Canadian city. The ore vessels, instead of going to Greenland in ballast, could take merchandise.

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The vessels visiting the most northerly Greenland settlements could on their homeward voyage touch at the Baffin-land settlements. Every point of the Bay would thus have assured communication at least once a year, on a paying basis.

(2) Formerly the whaling industry of Baffin Bay was a source of vast wealth, supplying a considerable share of the \$700,000,000 which Holland, Scotland, Norway and America have during the last 300 years derived from the whale. If both sides of the Bay belonged to Canada, it would become to all intents and purposes a closed sea, its resources the property of Canada. With judicious protection, the whaling industry would surely revive in Canadian hands and might in time spread once more over the entire Bay, affording support to a considerable population and a splendid recruiting ground for the British navy.

(3) Southern Greenland, free from large carnivora, could be developed into a splendid preserve of fur-bearing animals, where the musk-ox, chamois, mountain sheep, yak, vicuña, and other ruminants, whose natural home is near the snow line, would find a congenial habitat, in company with the native caribou. The growing scarcity of furs, and their rapidly increasing price, suggest the possibility of large returns from such an investment.

(4) Switzerland receives \$120,000,000 a year from tourists. With regular and commodious communication established, Greenland, with its marvelous icecap, 750,000 square miles in extent, its glaciers, icebergs, its four to five months' continuous daylight in summer, would soon vie with Switzer-

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land as a tourists' resort. Hotels, chalets, and rest houses would spring up, and remunerative occupation be provided for hundreds of guides, packers, and boatmen. As an incident to this tourist traffic, both Greenland and the other lands bordering on Baffin Bay would be minutely explored, with the practical certainty of the discovery of valuable minerals. A dozen Klondikes may await the prospector in that vast archipelago.

(5) The starting points of this tourist traffic would at first be the present Atlantic ports of Canada. Soon, however, it would be found desirable to abridge the ocean voyage. From the southeast corner of Labrador, with its splendid harbors, to the south end of Greenland, the distance is about 560 miles. There would thus be a motive to build a railway from Quebec to the strait of Belle Isle, whence a fourteen-knot steamer could reach Greenland in 40 hours.

(6) There would be another and far weightier motive. The southeast corner of Labrador is closer to Europe than any part of the North American continent. St. John's, Newfoundland, is some 50 miles closer, but has the disadvantage of being located on an island, which fact has hitherto prevented the realization of the oft-discussed Transatlantic Short Line. If the southeast corner of Labrador had railway connection, it would immediately attract a certain amount of Transatlantic fast traffic, in addition to that which already seeks the strait of Belle Isle every summer. On a globe, draw a line connecting Mazatlan (Pacific coast of Mexico), Fort Worth (Texas), St. Louis, Detroit, Toronto, Montreal, Quebec, the strait of Belle Isle, Blacksod Bay

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(Ireland), Dublin, London, Dover, Calais, Munich, Vienna, Constantinople. It is found to be practically an arc of a great circle, approximately bisecting the commerce of Europe. In other words, for most of the United States and Canada, the railway from Quebec to the strait of Belle Isle, which would soon be found desirable to accommodate the Greenland traffic, would also afford the quickest connection with Europe (and *vice versa*) for passengers, mail and fast freight. Within a few decades, the St. Louis, Toronto, Quebec, and Labrador line might become the most important railway line in America.

(7) If Greenland and the entire Baffin Bay trade belonged to Canada, and if a railway from Quebec to the strait of Belle Isle were in operation, Newfoundland would have two new motives for joining the Dominion: (a) to share in the Baffin Bay trade, (b) to get the long-desired tunnel to Labrador.

(8) Vessels sailing from Hudson strait to Liverpool have to pass close by Cape Farewell, the south end of Greenland. As soon as the Hudson Bay railway is finished, a rapidly growing traffic will spring up between Hudson Bay and Liverpool. It will require a close study of the ice conditions, and hence telegraphic connection with Cape Farewell will soon become a necessity. Since the station at that point will minister to British interests almost exclusively, it is desirable that it be under Canadian control.

(9) Captain Bernier's voyages have revived the hope of a Northwest Passage for commercial use, for about six weeks each summer. If practicable, it would at the same time permit the development of the resources of the entire Arctic

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archipelago, especially the copper deposits of Banks Land and the adjoining continental area. The saving of time is shown by the following comparison:

Distance from Liverpool to Yokohama

	Nautical Miles
By Northwest Passage.....	6,900
By Suez Canal.....	11,100
By Panama Canal.....	12,300

The vast improvement in naval architecture and in the science of navigation since the discovery of the Passage in 1854 suggests that what was impossible then may not be impossible now. Icebreakers of the Yermak type, directed by wireless telegraphy and airships, might readily cleave a path for a fleet of specially constructed vessels. The unique trip might soon become the supreme ambition of every tourist. Fortunately, at least three coal deposits are known to exist along the 2000 miles from Cape Lisburne to Wilcox Head, where icebreakers would be needed. This trade, too, would mostly be British, and there would be a manifest advantage in having the entire system, including the Greenland ports, under Canadian management.

* * *

But these immediate advantages to Canada would be insignificant compared to the effect which the acquisition of Greenland would have on the world at large. This aspect

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of the question was set forth by the present writer in the Minneapolis Journal and the Seattle Times, January 10 and 17, 1909 (German translation "Deutschland und Dänemark," Leipzig, Otto Wigand, April, 1909); Dansk-Amerikaneren of New York, February 17, 1909; Canadian Magazine, September, 1909; Le Courrier Européen, Paris, November 10, 1909, and September 25, 1911; and Quebec Chronicle, February 5 and 12, 1910, with preface by Prof. F. P. Walton, Dean of the Faculty of Law, McGill University. These articles were reviewed by Georg Brandes in "Politiken," of Copenhagen, December 17, 1911.

A subject which at first glance seems exclusively Canadian thus becomes worldwide in scope. This must be the author's excuse for his seeming obtrusiveness in urging it on the attention of Canadians. During the agitation first over the navy bill and next over reciprocity, it was difficult to gain a hearing for anything else. Now that both these questions are out of the way, Canadians may be willing to devote some thought to a subject which—let it be frankly asserted—is infinitely more important than either the navy bill or reciprocity.

That Denmark would be glad to get rid of Greenland can not be doubted, since that colony has for a long time been to her a source not of profit but of expense. As the price of it, however, the Danes would ask not a sum of money but some other land, by means of which they might regain what they prize most: their national unity. Bismarck and other prominent Germans have declared that Germany stands ready to restore to Denmark the Danish-speaking part of

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TOTAL DANISH-SPEAKING TERRITORY IN DENMARK AND
NORTH SCHLESWIG.

Schleswig, if a suitable equivalent can be found. Land is the only equivalent that would be acceptable, because Germany, whose direst trouble is lack of land, can not afford to surrender any territory except in exchange for a larger territory. Greenland is not suitable for that purpose, because neither the United States nor Canada would allow it to pass into the hands of another power. Thus the only practicable plan is to exchange Greenland for some British colonies and then offer those colonies to Germany in exchange for North Schleswig.

At the writer's request, a prominent gentleman in Copenhagen submitted this plan to leading men at the Danish capital. The result of his inquiry was communicated in a letter which says (in part):

"Every Dane with a particle of national feeling would hail the proposed exchange (Greenland for British colonies and these for North Schleswig) as the ideal solution for Denmark. If this were practicable, it would be a source of infinite delight to our dear little country. You would earn the gratitude of the entire Danish nation, from the King to the humblest peasant. There is no need of creating a sentiment in favor of the plan in Denmark, because everybody here necessarily favors it."

In view of the intimate relations between the British and Danish nations and dynasties, it can not be doubted that Britain would gladly aid Denmark in attaining her dearest wish. Greenland, enjoying the triple security due to geography, climate and the Monroe Doctrine, would need neither naval nor military protection, and thus by acquiring it in

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exchange for colonies that do need protection, the task of the British army and navy would be simplified. The control of the future station at Cape Farewell and of the approaches of the Northwest Passage is of even greater interest to Britain than to Canada. Most important of all, Britain has every motive to stimulate the development of the Dominion into a great nation, able to play a prominent part in assuring the greatness and safety of the empire. For the benefit of the British navy it is of special importance that Canada's maritime interests be developed and her seafaring population increased.

In brief, if Canada expresses a wish to own Greenland Britain will gladly cede to Denmark, out of her superabundance, some bits of land that may be mutually deemed equivalent.

* * *

Now comes the feature that makes the subject so tremendously important. The rivalry in naval armament between Britain and Germany arises from the belief, deeply rooted in the minds of the Germans, that Britain is unalterably opposed to any further acquisition of territory by Germany, and is trying to encircle her with hostile alliances. The alleged groundlessness of that belief would be palpably demonstrated if Britain ceded to Denmark certain colonies, knowing beforehand that they would promptly be transferred to Germany, thereby enabling Germany to become reconciled to Denmark. When Germany finds that her vital

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need—more land—is recognized by Britain, she in turn will be more apt to recognize Britain's vital need—naval supremacy. The improved goodwill, with the aid of Danish mediation, might readily ripen into the agreement suggested by the wisest man in England, Sir Harry H. Johnston, in the *Nineteenth Century* for December, 1910, providing for a limitation of armaments on the basis of British naval supremacy, Britain in return pledging her aid to Germany in acquiring such lands as may hereafter be on the market, which, as the clearsighted Sir Harry points out, would in German hands be actually more useful to Britain than in her own. The Australians, for example, who for a time objected violently to the German invasion of the Pacific, have long since found out that Germany in New Guinea is a volunteer outpost, adding to the security of White Australia without burdening its budget. In the Pacific, the British and German navies are by sheer necessity virtual allies.

To her future navy, Canada is preparing to devote a sum which would build hundreds of miles of railways and canals, scores of bridges, docks and breakwaters, and thus vastly increase her wealth-creating power. An Anglo-German agreement for a limitation of armaments would render the imprisonment of that sum unnecessary and leave it available for productive use.

Now that Irish home rule is assured, the Irish-Americans will naturally favor the political union of Britain and the United States in a Celtanglian Federation, because it would also mean union with Ireland. Anglo-German recon-

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ciliation would remove the most serious remaining obstacle: the opposition of the German-Americans. That vast body of voters, superbly organized in the National German-American Alliance, is opposed to closer relations between the United States and Britain, unless the relations between the United States and Germany shall be equally close. Whatever be the motives of this attitude, its effect is beneficial, because it is a constant admonition to those two kindred nations, Britain and Germany, to return to their "historic alliance" and grasp the immense benefits which it would offer to both. If this came to pass, the German-Americans would at once become the foremost advocates of Anglo-American reunion, because it would also mean reunion with the Fatherland, lending to it the immense advantage of America's support and supplying to Britain a powerful motive to fulfil the essential condition requisite to the maintenance of the Anglo-German alliance. Anglo-German reunion—after 1,400 years of separation—thus appears to be the indispensable prerequisite to Anglo-American reunion. And of course, as the wisest man in England observes, neither nation can be expected to come to terms with the other except for its own profit.

Dangers of the gravest kind threaten the British empire at this moment in India, Egypt and South Africa. They would instantly be dissipated through the accession of the defensive strength of America's 100 millions and their enormous resources. With her empire thus forever secure, Britain would no longer have any motive to oppose Germany's territorial expansion, but every motive to favor it.

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The precedent of an Anglo-German agreement would inevitably lead, through the force of example and through British mediation, to the Franco-German agreement persistently urged by the wisest man in England, to wit, the restitution of the French-speaking part of Alsace-Lorraine to France in exchange for a French colony, a compromise which the clearest thinkers in France and Germany long ago declared to be the most equitable (see map).

Thus the four strongest, most humane and enlightened powers, best prepared by identity of ideals to trust one another, would be so closely linked by mutual goodwill and common interest that their armies and navies would virtually coalesce into that world-commanding International Executive Power which Mr. Carnegie and Colonel Roosevelt regard as the indispensable condition to permanent universal peace. Canada could then solve her immigration problem without fear of embarrassing the Mother Country.

An alliance of two or three out of the four nations would indeed be "entangling;" but an alliance of all four, far from creating new embarrassments for them, would disentangle them from the present embarrassments. Whoever ponders over this fact and over the incalculable benefits which each of the four nations would gain by union with the others can hardly refrain from applying the harsh epithet of traitor to those peculiar patriots who dogmatize about "entangling alliances." It is enough to make the sagacious Father of his Country groan in his grave to hear the perpetual parrot-like repetition of a phrase which represented the highest

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ALSACE-LORRAINE

(5,604 SQUARE MILES)

Dark shade French-speaking, light shade German-speaking

wisdom at the end of the 18th century, when freedom was at stake, but the most pernicious folly at the beginning of the 20th, when union for the defense of their highest interests is the foremost duty of the free. Verily, the earth, a mere grain of sand in the solar system, a mere speck of dust in the universe, is small enough to be any man's country. Narrow must be the heart for which the infinitesimal is still too large. The thinking man's allegiance is due not to a small bit of the earth's crust, but to the highest types of humanity. "*Völker Europas, wahret eure höchsten Güter!*"

Science cures ills by ascertaining their causes and devising means for the removal of these causes. A science of peace is urgently needed. When a man has driven a splinter into his flesh, it would be very unscientific to be content with soothing lotions; the only effective remedy is to draw out the splinter. To preach international goodwill and yet leave the causes of international illwill untouched is not scientific.

* * *

"History is full of the errors of states and princes. Those who govern, having much business on their hands, do not generally like to take the trouble of considering and carrying into execution new projects. The best public measures are therefore seldom adopted from previous wisdom, but forced by the occasion." Thus wrote Benjamin Franklin, commenting on the reception accorded by British statesmen and American legislative assemblies to his plan of colonial

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union which, in his opinion, would have prevented the disruption of the British nation into two fragments. If the reunion of the two fragments is the supreme interest of the world, it would certainly seem worth while for those who govern to take the trouble of considering whether any business now on their hands can be more important than a measure which promises to remove the obstacles to reunion.

Icebreakers are needed all over the earth, to release nations hemmed in by frozen seas of senseless habits. A vigorous shock at the right spot may cause these stubborn crusts to crack in all directions. Fortune offers to Canada at this moment the gift of an icebreaker to accomplish a double task: to smash the paleocrystic floes that bar the approaches to the Arctic archipelago, and to shatter the neocrystic ice of distrust which during the last 20 years has formed between England and her mother Germany, as well as the 138-year-old ice of habit which makes England and her daughter technically foreign nations to each other. That icebreaker comes in the guise of a resolution to be introduced in the Canadian Parliament:

"RESOLVED, That the Government be requested to ascertain whether and under what conditions Greenland may be acquired by Canada."

If the arguments here advanced are sound, the mere vote of "Aye," without any further effort on the part of Canadians, would inevitably result in a "Greater Canada," through the addition of Greenland. It would probably lead also to the acquisition of Newfoundland, to Danish-German,

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
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
Anglo-German, Franco-German reconciliation, to Anglo-American reunion, to the absolute security of the British empire, and, most important of all, to permanent universal "peace with righteousness." The world's fate is in Canada's hands. The resolution would be the key to a new era, marked by the consolidation of the civilized nations into a great community, with Canada as the honored leader.


That key lies ready for any Canadian statesman to grasp and make himself the foremost man of his time.

WASHINGTON, D. C., *March 9, 1914.*

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